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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Preston Adam Joy appeals from the district court’s order granting the state’s motion for
summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In Joy’s most recent appeal of his underlying criminal case, the Idaho Court of Appeals
set forth the following factual and procedural history:
Joy and his wife, Jennifer, were involved in a domestic dispute. The State
charged Joy with second degree kidnapping, domestic battery, and penetration by
a foreign object. The district court held a preliminary hearing in which Jennifer
testified about the altercation and the manner in which the offenses were allegedly
committed. After a jury trial, the jury was hung on the second degree kidnapping
charge, but convicted Joy of the felony domestic battery charge and acquitted him
of the penetration by a foreign object charge. Before the district court could retry
the second degree kidnapping charge, Joy entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to appeal the court’s pretrial, trial, and post-trial rulings. Joy
appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Joy’s judgment of conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial on all the charges. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
304 P.3d 276 (2013). Before the second trial, the State sought to amend the
information by removing the penetration by a foreign object charge. The
amended information was otherwise the same as the information in the first trial.
Joy objected to the motion to amend on due process grounds, but the district court
granted the motion.
At the second trial, Jennifer testified that Joy became physically abusive
during an argument about Joy texting a former girlfriend and the location of his
keys and cell phone. According to Jennifer, the altercation began in the couple’s
bathroom where Joy pushed her into a cold tub of water, dunked her head in the
water, pulled her hair, hit her face, took off her clothes, and tied her wrists to her
left ankle. Jennifer testified that Joy then left the room, came back, gagged her
with a washcloth, dragged her to his pickup, put her in his pickup, and hit and
kicked her. She further testified that Joy drove his pickup to a remote part of the
property, hit and kicked her, pulled her hair, and threatened to tie her to a tree
unless she told him where his keys and phone were. According to Jennifer, she
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then falsely told him that she would tell him where his keys and phone were, and
the altercation ended.
Joy’s account of the altercation during his case-in-chief was markedly
different. Joy testified that Jennifer was intoxicated and she initiated the physical
violence. According to Joy, he used his arms to block Jennifer’s attacks and
defended himself by kicking at her. He testified that despite his efforts to defend
himself, Jennifer struck him in the face with her knee and stomped on and kicked
him. He further testified that he shoved her to escape and left the house, but
Jennifer followed him and tripped and fell off the deck. Then, according to Joy,
she charged at him and he threw her over a fence and down an embankment. Joy
testified that he then left in his pickup and when he returned, Jennifer voluntarily
got into his pickup with him and after he moved the pickup away from the house,
convinced him not to leave.
On cross-examination, Joy stated that Jennifer injured his mouth and legs
in their altercation. However, he also stated that bruising and swelling from these
injuries did not appear until after he was booked into jail and he did not tell the
booking officer about the injuries. Joy did not offer any further evidence of the
injuries on redirect. During the State’s rebuttal, the State called the booking
officer who testified that Joy told the officer that he was not injured. The booking
officer testified that booking procedures require officers to note any signs of
injury to arrestees, and the officer did not observe any sign of Joy’s alleged
injuries. Joy sought to offer surrebuttal evidence that he had an unrelated back
injury at booking that he did not reveal to the booking officer. According to Joy,
his failure to disclose the back injury showed he was not engaged in the booking
process which explained his failure to disclose the injuries allegedly inflicted by
Jennifer. The district court excluded the proffered surrebuttal evidence.
After the second trial, the jury convicted Joy of the felony domestic
battery charge and acquitted him of the second degree kidnapping charge.
State v. Joy, Docket No. 42166, Unpublished Op. No. 707, pp.1-3 (Idaho App., November 13,
2015). Joy timely appealed, arguing that the state’s amended information failed to comply with
due process; that the district court abused its discretion by refusing his proffered surrebuttal
evidence; and that the district court erred by failing to give the jury an unrequested specific
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unanimity instruction. Id. at 3. The Court of Appeals affirmed Joy’s conviction and sentence.
Id. at 9.
On May 16, 2016, Joy filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.5-11.) In
a subsequent amended petition, he set forth several claims: that his attorneys in his first trial were
ineffective (I) for waiving Joy’s right to a speedy trial, allegedly against his express instructions;
(II) for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the state’s information; (III) for failing to subpoena
witnesses and prepare for trial; and (IV) for not telling Joy that they married during the course of
the proceedings; and that his defense counsel during his second trial was ineffective (V) for
failing to assert Joy’s speedy trial rights; (VI) for failing to file upon remand a motion to
disqualify the district judge; and (VII) for conceding issues regarding an allegedly defective
information; and that (VIII) the district judge was biased against Joy. (R., pp.15-25.) The state
filed a motion for summary dismissal of Joy’s petition for post-conviction relief. (See R., pp.3250.) The district court granted the state’s motion. (R., p.56; 2/2/2017 Tr., p.18, L.13 – p.20,
L.13.) Joy also filed a motion to disqualify the district judge (R., pp.27-28), which the district
court denied (R., p.62; 1/9/2017 Tr., p.42, L.13 – p.44, L.3). Joy filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.58-60.)
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ISSUES
Joy states the issues on appeal as:
I.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Joy’s motion for
disqualification in the post-conviction proceeding.
II.
Given that Mr. Joy filed his petition within one year after a “proceeding
following an appeal” became final, the district court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the first trial
were time-barred under Idaho Code § 19-4902(a).
III.
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Count VI in Mr. Joy’s
amended petition because he alleged facts that, if true, established ineffective
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure, immediately after the first
appeal, to file a motion for the automatic disqualification of the presiding judge.
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Joy failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to disqualify for cause?
2.
Has Joy failed to show that the district court erred when it granted the state’s motion for
summary dismissal?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Joy Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His
Motion To Disqualify For Cause
A.

Introduction
Below, Joy filed a motion to disqualify the judge from presiding over his post-conviction

case, asserting that the judge was biased against him. (R., pp.27-28.) The district court denied
the motion both on its merits and because it was barred by res judicata. (1/9/2017 Tr., p.42, L.13
– p.44, L.3.) On appeal, Joy asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
recusal motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.) Application of the correct legal standards to the
facts, however, shows no abuse of the district court’s discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata is a question

of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 11
P.3d 481 (2000). “Whether it is necessary for a judicial officer to disqualify himself in a given
case is left to the sound discretion of the judicial officer himself.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial
Council, 149 Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 38, 44 (2009) (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206,
731 P.2d 192, 201 (1986)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Joy’s Motion To
Disqualify The Presiding Judge For Cause
The district court denied Joy’s motion for disqualification both because that motion had

already been decided and so was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and because, on the
motion’s merits, Joy failed to show that the district court could not perform the proper legal
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analysis. (1/9/2017 Tr., p.42, L.13 – p.44, L.3.) Both of these grounds were correct, and the
district court should be affirmed.

1.

The District Court Correctly Denied Joy’s Recusal Motion Because It Was Barred
By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata

The district court denied Joy’s recusal motion, in part, because it was already litigated
and decided in Joy’s underlying criminal case. (1/9/2017 Tr., p.42, Ls.13-18.) The doctrine of
res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment
or decision in an action between the same litigants. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482.
Similarly, claims which could have been raised to the Court previously but were not are barred in
subsequent litigation by the principles of res judicata. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760
P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988).
In his underlying criminal case, before his second trial, Joy filed a motion to disqualify
the presiding judge. (See R., pp.22-23, 27.) That motion was denied (R., p.23), and that denial
was not appealed. There appear to be no new grounds for recusal in Joy’s motion in this case; in
fact, defense counsel asked the court to accept and review the affidavit filed with the recusal
motion in the criminal case as the affidavit for this case. (1/9/2017 Tr., p.14, L.8 – p.15, L.4;
p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.5.) Because the issue of the judge’s alleged bias had been previously
decided—even if Joy’s current arguments in relation to that issue were not—those arguments
were barred under the doctrine of res judicata and are not properly brought before this Court.
The district court properly denied Joy’s recusal motion under the doctrine of res judicata.
Joy does not appear to challenge this ruling on appeal, instead jumping directly to his
argument on the merits. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.) When the basis for a trial court’s
ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. See
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State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Because
Joy has failed to challenge the district court’s determination that the merits of his recusal motion
had already been determined in a prior action, the district court’s ruling on that issue should be
affirmed on this unchallenged basis.

2.

The District Court Properly Denied Joy’s Recusal Motion Upon Finding That It
Could Perform The Required Legal Analysis

The district court also properly denied Joy’s motion on its relative merits. (Tr., p.42,
L.18 – p.44, L.3.) Rule 40 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides the grounds for
disqualification of a presiding judge and allows a party to disqualify a judge on the grounds of
bias or prejudice. I.R.C.P. 40(b)(1)(D). Whatever the source of the bias or prejudice alleged, it
must be so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. Back v. Bagley, 148
Idaho 784, 791-792, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153-1154 (2010). Unless there is a demonstration of
pervasive bias derived from either an extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial,
there is no basis for judicial recusal. Id. at 792, 229 P.3d at 1154.
When a trial judge presides over both the criminal trial and later post-conviction
proceedings, that judge “is not required to erase from his mind all that has gone before.” State v.
Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 215, 766 P.2d 678, 685 (1988). Rather, the standard only requires that the
judge “concluded that he can properly perform the legal analysis which the law requires of him,
recognizing that he has already pre-judged the case and has formed strong and lasting opinions
regarding the worth of the defendant” and the proper sentence to impose. Id. The district judge
made this determination, concluding that it could “properly perform the legal analysis … that is
required of me on this post-conviction relief case.” (1/9/2017 Tr., p.43, L.23 – p.44, L.1.)
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Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion (which Joy also does not appear to challenge),
Joy asserts that bias in this case is manifest in the district court’s reversal after the first trial
(ignoring its affirmance on remand) and clear view that its procedures and sentence imposed in
the underlying criminal trial were correct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) The Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument in Beam. In that case, the Court first recognized that “[e]very trial
judge who rules upon a post[-]conviction review proceeding … will previously have pre-judged
the matter … and will no doubt be convinced that the procedure followed and the sentence
imposed was correct.” Beam, 115 Idaho at 215, 766 P.2d at 685. It then held that “[c]oming to
the case with that frame of mind does not constitute bias or prejudice … and does not require
disqualification of the trial judge.” Id. Joy has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his recusal motion.
On appeal, Joy also asserts that “this Court should turn aside any argument from the State
that Mr. Joy did not strictly comply with Rule 40(b)(2) based on a supposed failure to file an
affidavit in support.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

In fact, a motion for recusal must be

accompanied by an affidavit “stating distinctly the grounds upon which disqualification is based
and the facts relied upon in support of the motion.” I.R.C.P. 40(b)(2). And Joy’s motion
(contrary to his assertions on appeal), was not actually accompanied by an affidavit. (See R.,
pp.27-28.)
In his motion to recuse, Joy asserted that his motion was supported by “the record”; his
“Defendant’s Request for Self-Recusal or in the Alternative to Recuse for Cause[,] filed on
March 5, 2014”; “the allegations and reported decisions set forth in Defendant’s Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction relief”; and “the appearance of fairness requirement and due process
protections afforded to Defendant.” (R., p.27.) None of these appear to be affidavits. And while
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Joy claims that the verified petition he filed in post-conviction is an affidavit and/or the motion
to disqualify he filed before the second criminal trial contained an affidavit (Appellant’s brief,
p.12), neither was attached to the motion in this case, as the rule requires. Below, Joy seems to
have recognized that his motion was deficient in this respect; he claimed that his motion would
be supported by his “forthcoming supporting affidavit stating distinctly supporting facts and
grounds upon which disqualification is sought.”

(R., p.27.)

This forthcoming affidavit,

however, never appears to have come.
Regardless, the district court did not deny Joy’s motion for being deficient; it correctly
denied it, both because it had already ruled on practically the same motion following remand,
and because Joy’s motion in this case lacked merit. The district court was correct that Joy’s
motion was barred by res judicata—a conclusion Joy does not challenge on appeal. The district
judge did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it was capable of performing the legal
analysis the law required of him. Joy has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his recusal motion. The district court’s order, denying Joy’s motion,
should be affirmed.

II.
Joy Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Granted The State’s Motion For
Summary Dismissal
A.

Introduction
Below, Joy filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging eight separate claims on

which relief could be granted, four each in his first and second trials. (R., pp.5-11.) The state
filed a motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.32-50), which the district court granted (R., p.56).
On appeal, Joy asserts that the district court erred by granting the state’s motion for summary
dismissal of claims I-IV, each of which related to the first criminal trial, and claim VI, which
9

related to the second. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-22.) Application of the correct legal standards to
Joy’s petition, however, shows that Joy’s application was properly subject to summary dismissal.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file ….” Workman v. State, 144
Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57
P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Joy Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,
662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for
post-conviction relief.

Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).

However, unlike other civil complaints, in post-conviction cases the “application must contain
much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).” Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). Instead, the
application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon
which the application is based.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903). “The application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
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to dismissal.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 194903).
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief in response to a party’s motion. “To withstand summary dismissal, a postconviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of
the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,
72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).
Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal “if the applicant’s
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho
at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). “Allegations
contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of
law.” Id.
In each of the claims relevant to this appeal, Joy asserted that his various trial counsel
were ineffective. (See R., pp.16-21.) Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively
deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that
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counsel’s performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 177 P.3d 362, 368
(2008) (citations omitted).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id.

1.

The District Court Was Correct To Dismiss Claims I-IV, Albeit On The
Alternative Grounds Asserted In The State’s Motion To Dismiss

In its motion for summary dismissal, the state sought dismissal of claims I-IV on the
alternative grounds that claims I-IV were moot and, in addition, claim II had already been
decided in Joy’s appeal (R., pp.32-33), or that all of the claims were untimely (R., pp.49-50).
The district court granted the state’s motion on the grounds that the claims were untimely.
(2/2/2017 Tr., p.18, L.13 – p.19, L.8.) On appeal, Joy argues that the district court erred.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15.) Joy is correct.
Idaho Code § 19-4902 creates a statute of limitation to the filing of post-conviction
applications and provides that “[a]n application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from
the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.” I.C. § 19-4902(a).
While Joy’s petition was not filed within a year and 42 days of his original judgment of
conviction, nor within a year following the determination of the appeal of that judgment, it was
filed within a year of proceedings following his appeal. Under the statute, the limitation period
begins at the finality of judgment. Peregrina v. State, 158 Idaho 948, 951, 354 P.3d 510, 513
(2015). Judgment did not become final after Joy’s first criminal trial because, following Joy’s
appeal, that judgment was vacated. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 17, 304 P.3d 276, 292 (2013).
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Rather, judgment in this case became final when the remittitur entered in the Court of Appeals’
affirmance of Joy’s judgment of conviction following his second criminal trial. Joy’s petition for
post-conviction relief, including claims I-IV, was filed within the year allowed by the statute.
(Compare 42166 Remittitur with R., p.5.)
That the district court incorrectly dismissed Joy’s claims I-IV on this erroneous basis
does not, however, end the analysis. In its brief in support of summary dismissal, the state
provided alternative grounds for dismissing these claims. The alternative grounds were correct,
and this Court may affirm on those alternative grounds. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21
P.3d 895, 901 (2001).
The state argued that claims I-IV were each subject to summary dismissal because they
were moot. (R., pp.32-33.) The mootness doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Idaho Schools
for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996)
(quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). “Justiciability
issues, such as mootness, are freely reviewed.” State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327,
329 (2010) (citing State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005)).
“A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will
have no practical effect upon the outcome.” In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 179 P.3d 300, 303
(2008) (citation omitted). The result of Joy’s appellate proceedings following his first criminal
trial was remand for a new criminal trial. Joy, 155 Idaho at 17, 304 P.3d at 292. In this case,
were Joy able to show that he was entitled to relief on any of claims I-IV, his remedy would be a
new criminal trial. Because Joy has already received the relief that he would be entitled to if his
claims were successful, he is entitled to no additional relief and judicial determination of this
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issue will have no practical effect upon the outcome. Joy’s claims are therefore moot. These
claims fail as a matter of law, and the district court was ultimately correct to dismiss them.
The state also argued that Claim II, that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging
the sufficiency of the information on which Joy was originally tried, was subject to summary
dismissal because the sufficiency of the information had already been addressed by the Court of
Appeals. (R., p.33.) Although the Court of Appeals addressed the sufficiency of the amended
information used at the second criminal trial, rather than the information used at the first trial, its
analysis is equally applicable to the original information filed in the criminal case. The only
change between the original and amended information was the removal of an additional charge;
“[t]he amended information was otherwise the same as the information in the first trial.” State v.
Joy, Docket No. 42166, Unpublished Op. No. 707, p.2 (Idaho App., November 13, 2015). That
information complied with due process because, though it could have included more factual
specificity, Joy was already apprised of the facts underlying the charge due to, inter alia, his
preliminary hearing. Id., pp.3-4 (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 46, 89 P.3d 881, 886 (Ct.
App. 2003) (“a defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the
information when those details are already known to the defendant or are provided to him by
means other than the information, such as through preliminary hearing testimony”)). Because
the Court of Appeals determined that the information was sufficient to comply with due process,
Joy’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the sufficiency of the
information also fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the district court was ultimately correct to
dismiss it.
Before a petitioner’s post-conviction application can be dismissed, that petitioner is
entitled to notice of the grounds upon which it will be dismissed. See Ridgley v. State, 148
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Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010). The state’s motion for summary dismissal, setting
forth grounds for dismissal, provides that notice. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200
P.3d 1148, 1150 (2008). Because Joy had notice that claim II was subject to summary dismissal
on the basis that the issue underlying the claim had already been decided by the Court of
Appeals, and that claims I-IV were subject to summary dismissal because they are moot, the
district court could have correctly dismissed these claims on these grounds. “Where the lower
court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory,” this Court can still apply the “correct
theory” and affirm. Row, 135 Idaho at 579, 21 P.3d at 901. The district court’s denial of these
claims should therefore be affirmed.

2.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Claim VI

The state sought dismissal of claim VI, that defense counsel failed to disqualify the
presiding judge in the second trial, on the basis that Joy’s counsel did file a motion to disqualify
(for cause), and that, at any rate, Joy failed to show prejudice because he failed to show that the
district judge was anything other than impartial. (R., p.34.) The district court granted the state’s
motion on the grounds that Joy presented no factual or legal basis to find that the judge was
biased. (2/2/2017 Tr., p.19, L.20 – p.20, L.2.) The district court was correct.
On appeal, Joy argues that his attorney was deficient for failing to timely file a motion to
disqualify the district judge without cause, as Joy allegedly requested. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1522.) Joy further contends that, had his attorney timely filed the motion to disqualify, “success
was assured.” (Id., p.20.) The state agrees, see Bower v. Morden, 126 Idaho 215, 880 P.2d 245
(1994), and this is sufficient to make a prima facie case of deficient performance.
But Joy then argues that the assured success of the motion to disqualify also demonstrates
prejudice. (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.) Joy is mistaken. Contrary to his assertions, he is not
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entitled to a presumption of prejudice.

Rather, under Strickland, he is required to show

prejudice, which is that, but for his attorney’s deficient performance, “the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.” Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 154, 177 P.3d at 368. Joy failed
to allege, much less show, that the outcome of this trial would have been different had his
attorney disqualified the district judge.
Joy asserts that he is not required to demonstrate prejudice. He argues that his case is
analogous to Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), or Iowa v. Keller, 760 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa
2009), and Pennsylvania v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686 (Penn. 2008)—in none of which, he claims,
was the petitioner required to show the probability of ultimate acquittal. (Appellant’s brief,
p.21.) What Joy fails to recognize is that these cases dealt with a defendant’s deprivation,
through waivers caused by counsel’s deficiencies, of a constitutional right. Hill, 474 U.S. at 5860 (right to trial); Keller, 760 N.W.2d at 453 (trial by jury); Mallory, 941 A.2d at 700-01 (same).
Joy’s case is easily distinguishable: While Joy is constitutionally entitled to an impartial judge,
he has no constitutional right to disqualify a judge absent a clear showing of bias. Cf. I.C.R.
25(a) (ability to disqualify without cause is conferred by rule, not constitutional right).
Joy has failed to show that his attorney’s failure to file a timely motion to disqualify
(without cause) deprived him of any constitutional rights. Because there was no constitutional
right at issue in the attorney’s alleged deficient performance, Joy was required to show that the
outcome of the second trial would have been different absent his attorney’s deficient
performance. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 154, 177 P.3d at 368. Joy failed to allege, much less show,
this prejudice. The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed claim VI.
Joy’s application for post-conviction relief was properly subject to summary dismissal.
Though the district court granted summary dismissal of claims I-IV on an erroneous basis, this
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Court can still affirm the dismissal on the correct legal bases, on which the state provided notice
in its motion to dismiss. The district court correctly dismissed claim VI because, having failed to
allege prejudice, Joy failed to show a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel on
which he could be granted relief. The district court was ultimately correct to dismiss Joy’s
petition for post-conviction relief and should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Joy’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer_____________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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